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Background
The Cuban Missile Crisis served
as a prime example of the importance of
photointelligence in the successful
management of an international crisis.
President Kennedy was provided with
excellent, but not faultless, intelligence
through the use of photointelligence.
Kennedy used photointelligence to
decide upon his policy of quarantine.
The quarantine and subsequent
diplomatic efforts led to a successful
resolution of the missile crisis, with a
minimum loss to American interests.
During the Crisis, Kennedy followed the
example of President Eisenhower in
using photointelligence to make foreign
policy decisions.
President Eisenhower set the
precedent for the collection and use of
photoreconnaissance. In 1954, President
Eisenhower allocated $22 million for the
CIA to develop a high altitude
reconnaissance airplane. Lockheed
accepted the contract and produced the
U-2 prototype. Allen Dulles, director of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and President Eisenhower agreed to fund
the development of the plane. The CIA
would be responsible for refining the
photographs into meaningful
intelligence. Less than three months later
the first U-2 prototype was ready for
testing.1
                                                
1 Dino A. Brugioni. Eyeball to Eyeball: The
Inside Story of the Cuban missile Crisis. (New
York: Random House, 1991) 18-19. Hereafter
Dino Brugioni calls the U-2 “the
biggest intelligence bargain in history”.2
Brugioni, a senior photointerpreter,
makes this assertion because the U-2
gave the CIA unmatched access to
strategic intelligence within the Soviet
Union. Within two years the bargain
began to pay off.  U-2 photography
provided much needed data regarding
strategic weapons development within
the Soviet Union. Human intelligence
sources were unable to provide
comprehensive data on the Soviet
strategic weapons. The CIA began to fly
U-2 photointelligence missions over the
Soviet Union began on 4 July, 1956.
Over flights of the Soviet Union ended
in 1960, after Gary Powers was shot
down near Sverdlovsk. These missions
proved that the Khrushchev was
exaggerating the number of nuclear
missiles and bombers that the Soviet
Union could deploy. The U-2 also
provided vital information on the status
of the Soviet space program. Finally, U-
2 photographs were used to compile lists
of important targets for the air force, in
the event of war.3
Eisenhower used the U-2 to
obtain intelligence during the Suez crisis
of 1956. In many ways this crisis mirrors
the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the
Suez crisis U-2s provided indisputable
intelligence. The photointelligence gave
Eisenhower advance notice of military
action against Egypt. U-2 missions
uncovered preparations for a joint
Anglo-French and Israeli strike against
the Sinai desert. U-2s also monitored the
shipment of arms to Israel. During the
                                                                  
cited as EtE. Prototype completed in three
months: Michael R. Beschloss. Mayday:
Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair.
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986)
365. Hereafter cited as Mayday.
2 Brugioni. EtE. 18.
3 Beschloss. Mayday. 121,363-366
crisis U-2 photography revealed that
Israel was receiving advanced aircraft
from France. During the crisis
Eisenhower objected to the Israeli
deception concerning the number of
French aircraft received. The Israeli
government claimed that had received
only twenty-four jet bombers from
France. Photointelligence revealed sixty
bombers in the Israeli Air Force paint
scheme.4
Following the 1960 election,
John F. Kennedy became the President.
Eisenhower directed senior intelligence
officers to brief the incoming president
on the collection and usage of
photographic intelligence. During these
briefings President Eisenhower
recounted how useful the intelligence
had been, and provided Kennedy with
examples of the intelligence. President
Eisenhower also informed Kennedy of
the various intelligence sharing
agreements with the United Kingdom.
Kennedy, just like Eisenhower before
him, came to value photointelligence as
a primary source for information on
Soviet military events.5
Fidel Castro overthrew the
Batista government of Cuba in late1958.
After assuming office Castro ordered the
kidnapping of U.S. nationals and
taxation of American businesses on the
island; both of these acts earned him the
enmity of the American government.
Castro was decidedly anti-American, but
he had not yet declared himself as a
Communist. Initially, the Soviet Union
relied on foreign newspapers to monitor
the situation in Havana. Within a few
months the Soviet Union was able to
establish diplomatic relations with
Castro’s government. When Castro
                                                
4 Brugioni. EtE. 33-34. Beschloss. Mayday. 136-
139.
5 Brugioni, EtE. 56-57.
declared his solidarity with the Soviet
bloc, the CIA immediately began covert
operations, including sabotage and
psychological operations, designed to
remove him from power. These
operations culminated in the Bay of Pigs
invasion.6
On 17 April, 1961 1,400 Cuban
exiles assaulted the Bay of Pigs in a US
sponsored invasion. The security
surrounding the planning for the
invasion had been severely breached in
the months prior to the invasion. Castro
was able to position his forces on the
exact beaches the invaders landed on.
President Kennedy, only partially
committed to the plan, refused to
provide American air support. This
incident severely tarnished Kennedy’s
reputation at home and abroad. Kennedy
believed that the Bay of Pigs invasion
was the largest mistake of his
presidency.7
Arms Buildup in Cuba
The American failure at the Bay
of Pigs pushed Castro closer to the
Soviet Union. Castro feared that the
United States would attempt another
invasion, with more men and resources.
In the months following the Bay of Pigs,
Castro consulted with Soviet emissaries
about upgrading the Cuban armed
                                                
6 Castro’s victory and anti-American activates
recounted in James B. Nathan. Anatomy of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 2001.) Hereafter cited as
Anatomy 22-25. Lack of Soviet connection with
Castro in Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev
Remembers. (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Company, 1970) 488-489. Hereafter cited as KR
7 Nathan. Anatomy. 46-50; Thomas G. Patterson
and William J. Brophy. “October Missiles and
November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis
and American Politics, 1962” The Journal of
American History, Vol. 73, No. 1 (June, 1986)
94.
forces. Eventually, Castro asked the
Soviet Union for shipments of advanced
weaponry for the Cuban armed forces.8
Premier Khrushchev agreed to Castro’s
request for weapons. Khrushchev states
that he armed the Cubans in order to
protect Cuba from American aggression.
Some weapons had been sent to Cuba
before the Bay of Pigs invasion, after the
invasion, the Soviets sharply increased
their arms shipments. Tanks, artillery,
small arms and anti-aircraft guns were
the primary weapons sent to Cuba.9
As Khrushchev considered the
problem of American intentions toward
Cuba, he became convinced that
conventional weapons might not be
enough of a deterrent. During a state
visit to Bulgaria, Khrushchev decided to
deploy medium range ballistic missiles
(MRBM) to Cuba in conjunction with a
group of Soviet forces. The introduction
of nuclear missiles in Cuba would deter
the Americans from attempting another
invasion of Cuba. Additionally,
stationing these forces in Cuba would
help to correct the strategic balance of
power between the Soviet Union and the
Americans.10
Secrecy was vital to
Khrushchev’s plan. Khrushchev had
planned to announce the missiles only
after they were in position and
operational. This announcement would
force the Americans to accept a
Communist government in Cuba, and
would leave the Americans with no
chances for a successful attack against
the island. However, if the missiles were
discovered before they were fully
deployed; the Soviets would be in a very
vulnerable and disadvantageous position.
With the construction of the missile sites
                                                
8 Nathan. Anatomy. 55.
9 Khrushchev. KR. 491-492.
10 Ibid.
uncovered, the United States could
remove the missiles through military or
diplomatic force. If the missiles were
discovered before they could be made
operational, Khrushchev’s plan would be
ruined.11
During the crisis that followed,
President Kennedy made extensive use
of photointelligence. This became the
most important source of intelligence
with regards to Cuba. The use of
photointelligence took three distinct
phases during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Starting in late July of 1962 U-2
missions were used to monitor the flow
of Soviet arms in to Cuba. Photography
from the 14 October mission revealed
Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. When
President Kennedy was informed of this
development, he ordered all knowledge
of the missiles classified until he could
decide on a course of action. After 21
October, 1962, the President Kennedy
used photointelligence to inform the
public of the Soviet missile threat. This
publicity established credibility for the
quarantine. During the last days of the
crisis photointelligence was used for
verification of Soviet compliance with
the removal agreement. In order to
understand the contribution of
photointelligence, the problem must be
studied from its beginnings.
The situation in Cuba became
more serious during the late part of July
in 1962.  From July through mid-
October the United States used
photointelligence to monitor the
shipment of Soviet arms into Cuba.
Between August and the beginning of
October, 1962, the CIA averaged three
U-2 missions per month over Cuba.
After the discovery of ballistic missiles,
the frequency of U-2 missions greatly
increased. In the week following the
                                                
11 Ibid. 439-494.
initial discovery, there were seventeen
over flights of Cuba.12
The CIA integrated many
different types of intelligence to track
the Soviet build up in Cuba. Cuban
refugees were a source of information
regarding Soviet deployments in Cuba.
Refugees were interviewed at a facility
located at the Opa-Locka Air Force
Base, in Florida. The CIA was
dissatisfied with the refugee reports,
because they produced a contradictory
and unclear picture of Soviet forces
within Cuba. None of the refugee reports
of nuclear missiles could be verified.
Signals and electronic intelligence would
also be used in supporting roles during
the crisis. Aerial photointelligence was
selected as the primary means of
gathering intelligence regarding Cuba.13
The CIA first observed large
arms shipments in late July. During this
time there was not an effective air
defense network over the island, so U-2s
flew over the entire length of the island
twice on each flight. These flight plans
covered almost the entire island of Cuba.
These missions produced vertical
photographs, in which the U-2 flies
directly over the target area.
Photointerpreters judge this type of
photography produced as the most
                                                
12 Document 1-“Maps of Cuban over flights” in,
Central Intelligence Agency. The Secret Cuban
Missile Crisis Documents. (Washington D.C.,
Brassey’s (US), 1994. 1-3. Hereafter cited as
CIA Documents.
13 Raymond L. Garthoff. “US Intelligence in the
Cuban Missile Crisis” in James G. Blight and
David A. Welch, eds. Intelligence and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. (London, Frank Cass: 1998) 22-
23. Hereafter cited as Intelligence.; Patterson
and. Brophy. “October Missiles and November
Elections:” The Journal of American History,
Vol. 73, No. 1 (June, 1986) 98.
useful, because of the low degree of
angular distortion.14
The CIA analysts concluded that
the Soviets were using a standard
strategy for sending arms to Cuba.
Under this approach conventional
weapons, such as rifles and machine
guns, would be sent the Cuba in the
initial shipments. Heavier weapons, such
as tanks and artillery, would be sent
next. Finally, the Soviets would send
advanced antiaircraft defenses; namely
the SA-2 surface to air missile (SAM).
This pattern had been demonstrated in
other Soviet client states, such as Egypt
and Syria.15
During the 29 August flight
August a U-2 mission discovered several
surface to air missile sites in Cuba. This
discovery seemed to prove the analysts
right, about the Soviet arms delivery
strategy in Cuba. These sites were
equipped with the SA-2 missile system,
referred to as “GUIDELINE” in US
intelligence. One of these missiles had
shot down Gary Powers’ U-2 over the
Soviet Union, in 1960. These missiles
were designed to handle single targets,
as opposed to large groups of aircraft. If
linked together in a network, these
missiles could make over flights of Cuba
dangerous. Such a defense network
could completely prevent U-2 over
flights.16
Following the discovery of SA-2
sites, the Kennedy administration
ordered greater caution for U-2 over
flights of Cuba. The CIA was ordered to
stop direct over flights of the island.
                                                
14 Document 1-“Maps of Cuban over flights”;
Document 2- “Timetable of Soviet Military
Buildup in Cuba” in CIA Documents 1-8.
15 Brugioni. EtE.  62-63.
16 Discovery of SA-2 sites Doc. 2 “Timetable of
Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba” in CIA
Documents, 7. SA-2 Data from Federation of
American Scientists.
New missions would have to be flown
around the perimeter of the island at a
twenty-five mile range, keeping the
planes outside the range of the
antiaircraft missiles. These new missions
would produce oblique photography
instead of vertical photography. Oblique
photography would have lower quality
than vertical photography, but would
still be of use to the CIA.   This was
deemed to be an acceptable trade off in
order to reduce the risks associated with
the flights.17
The mission on 14 October 1962
would completely change the nature of
the crisis. A U-2 flown by Major
Richard Heyser flew over San Cristobal,
near Havana. This site was selected for
over flight because there were
indications of ballistic missile activities
at the site. These indications included
signals intelligence that pointed to
ballistic missile deployment in the area.
Refugee reports of suspicious convoys
and construction also drew the attention
of the route planners.18
Major Heyser’s flight produced
the first tangible evidence of Soviet
nuclear missiles in Cuba. A series of
transporters for the SS-4 missile were
photographed, along with support
equipment. These forces were located
near the town of San Cristobal. Poor
weather had delayed Major Heyser’s
flight several times in the preceding
days. In retrospect these delays proved
to be beneficial to the mission. The
Soviets had only moved the missiles and
                                                
17 Doc. 45 “U-2 overflights of Cuba” in CIA
Documents. 127-137.
18 Description of mission in Brugioni, EtE, 181-
186.; Signals intelligence mentioned in James
Bamford. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on
America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company: 1982) 215; Refugee
reports mentioned in Doc. 45 “U-2” overflights
of Cuba” in CIA Documents, 136.
support equipment into the area a few
days before. Without these delays there
would have been no activity to observe
at San Cristobal. The next series of
flights would not have been scheduled
until early November, after the missiles
would have been in place and
operational.19
After the film was processed, the
photointerpreters realized they were
looking at Soviet nuclear missile
transporters. The interpreters brought
their suspicions to George Lundahl, the
director of the National
Photointelligence Center (NPIC).
Due to the serious nature of this
development, Lundahl asked the
interpreters to reexamine their
assessment. Later during the evening of
the fourteenth, the interpreters confirmed
their assessment of the intelligence. The
interpreters based their identification on
the dimensions of the missile
transporters. SS-4 ballistic missiles were
approximately seventy feet in length,
longer than any other kind of deployed
Soviet missile. The length of these
missiles had been established during
years of photography in and over the
Soviet Union. The missile transporters
sighted at San Cristobal were between
sixty-five and seventy feet in length.
Lundahl was satisfied with this
confirmation and notified McGeorge
Bundy, President Kennedy’s special
advisor.20
On October the sixteenth
President Kennedy was briefed on the
discovery over Cuba and shown the U-2
                                                
19 Brugioni, EtE, 181-182, 198-202, 448. Flights
over Cuba were generally scheduled twice per
month, weather permitting.
20 Dimensions of SS-4 from Federation of
American Scientists. Available online at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater.r-
12.htm; NPIC activities in Brugioni. EtE 199-
204
photographs. The president ordered that
all information regarding the missiles in
Cuba was to be kept secret until the
administration had decided on a course
of action. Kennedy immediately began
debating with his advisors on the best
course of action to respond to this threat.
Later that day the president formed the
Executive Committee (ExComm) of the
National Security Council to handle the
crisis. The group included Robert
Kennedy, the Attorney General; Robert
McNamara, the Secretary of Defense
and Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State.21
 At the first meetings of the
ExComm an early consensus was
reached favoring an air strike on
strategic targets in Cuba, possibly
followed by an invasion. This option
was recommended by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Initially, President Kennedy
favored such a response. The only
serious opposition came from Robert
Kennedy. Robert Kennedy opposed air
strikes on the grounds of the negative
publicity that course of action would
create, and the precedent for Soviet
forces to attack American installations.22
During the next five days President
Kennedy and ExComm deliberated over
the best course of action toward the
Cuban situation. On 16 October 1962 the
President issued a “blanket
authorization” for U-2 flights over the
island. During this period there were
seventeen flights over the island. These
flights generated much vital intelligence
                                                
21 Doc. 16 “Transcript of the first Executive
Committee meeting” in The Cuban Missile
Crisis: A National Security Archives Reader.
Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds. (New
York, The New Press: 1998) 96.
22 Doc. 16 ‘Transcript of the first Executive
Committee Meeting” in NSA Reader. 95-106.
about the Soviet forces deployed in
Cuba.23
Photointelligence helped shape
President Kennedy’s course of action.
During this five day period a consensus
emerged that favored a naval blockade
of Cuba. U-2 over flights produced a
tremendous amount of intelligence about
the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba.
The intelligence flights allowed the CIA
to identify several more missile bases in
Cuba, including sites for longer range
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.
Photointelligence also allowed the CIA
to monitor the construction of the missile
sites. The CIA used this intelligence to
estimate that some missile sites could be
prepared for operations within a week.24
This deadline gave the strategy
deliberations an added sense of urgency.
Any strike against the missiles would
have to be preformed before the
weapons became operational. Such a
strike would also have to destroy all the
missile sites or risk retaliation from the
surviving missiles. The intelligence
experts were never positive that they had
identified every missile site and
informed the president of this opinion.
President Kennedy decided to adopt a
strategy that would reduce the possibility
of armed conflict and use the least
offensive show of force. Kennedy
ordered the Navy to establish a naval
“quarantine” of Cuba.25
During the last week in October
the Kennedy administration used
photointelligence to establish the
                                                
23 Doc. 45 “”U-2 Overflights of Cuba” in CIA
Documents. 137.; Gen. William Y. Smith. “The
View From Washington” in Operation ANADYR
(Chicago, edition q: 1994) 124.
24 Raymond L. Garthoff. “US Intelligence in the
Cuban Missile Crisis” in Intelligence. 26-29.
25 Raymond L. Garthoff. “US Intelligence in the
Cuban Missile Crisis” in Intelligence. 26-29;
Anatomy. 94.
credibility of the quarantine, at home
and abroad. The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs
had seriously strained President
Kennedy’s credibility with regards
towards Cuba. If Kennedy’s quarantine
was to succeed, international and
domestic political support would be
vital. Photointelligence provided the
administration with irrefutable proof of
the Soviet missile threat in Cuba. The
administration used this proof to secure
the support of key allies in Europe and
the Western hemisphere.
Crisis and Credibility
President Kennedy decided to
disclose the missiles in Cuba on 22
October, 1962. That afternoon the
principal allies of the United States were
informed of the missiles in Cuba crisis.
At 7 P.M., the President informed the
American people of the developments in
Cuba. In both of these disclosures,
domestic and international,
photointelligence served as an
incontestable confirmation of Soviet
missiles in Cuba.
The heads of government of the
major Western allies were briefed on the
situation in Cuba. The briefings were
handled in order of the political power of
the nation involved. The British
government was informed first, at
approximately seven in the morning. A
briefing for the French government
followed at eleven A.M. The German
and Canadian governments were the last
to be informed.26 All of the briefings
followed the same general format. The
                                                
26 Sherman Kent. The Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962. :Presenting the Photographic Evidence
Abroad. (1972) Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/cubakent.htm.   
Accessed 30 October 2003. 2. Hereafter cited as
Presenting.
resident ambassadors in each country
delivered a letter from President
Kennedy, along with a copy of the
President’s speech that would be
delivered later that evening. Each
ambassador was accompanied by a CIA
officer and copies of the intelligence
photographs showing the missile sites in
Cuba. The CIA officers would be
responsible for the intelligence briefings
directed toward the heads of
government. These officers would also
be responsible for responding to any
questions raised by the government
officials.27
The CIA briefing notes continued
the major topics covered in the
presentations. These topics included the
reasons for the Soviet missile
deployment, descriptions of the arms
buildup in Cuba, and descriptions of the
offensive weapons and their capabilities.
These presentation notes stress that the
President’s decision is based on high
quality intelligence of Soviet activities in
Cuba. High and low level
photointelligence are cited as the
primary, and most reliable, sources of
information in this situation.28
Soviet strategic weapons were
given a good deal of coverage in the
briefing notes. Photointelligence
identified ships carrying Il-28 nuclear
capable bombers in the early part of
October. Further missions allowed the
CIA to track the assembly and
preparation of these jet bombers. The
discovery of these planes prompted the
CIA to intensify photointelligence
efforts, which led to the uncovering of
the ballistic missile bases.29
                                                
27 Ibid.
28 Document 74-“Soviet Military Buildup in
Cuba.” 247-259 in CIA Documents.
29 Ibid.
The briefing notes feature
detailed information about the status of
these missile bases in Cuba. The notes
stress that the missiles were identified
through comparison between the
imagery from missions over Cuba and
photography from sources within the
Soviet Union, such as parades and field
exercises. These notes give an
approximate operational date of the first
of November for the existing sites in
Cuba.30
The CIA officers were instructed
to report on the reaction of the foreign
officials to this information. As Sherman
Kent, a CIA officer during the Crisis,
points out any observer can discern the
basic details of an aerial photograph.
However, it takes a highly trained
photointerpreter to distinguish between
different classes of missiles. The CIA
wanted to assure that their
interpretations were readily accepted. In
the end, the CIA had no reasons to
worry.31
British Prime Minister
Macmillan only glanced at the
photographs. Macmillan readily
accepted the CIA’s expertise in dealing
with photointelligence and Soviet
weapons systems. French President de
Gaulle also accepted the CIA’s
interpretation without question. Kent
recounts that these men did not question
the authenticity of the intelligence, as
long as President Kennedy vouched for
it. Other senior civil servants, such as the
British and French ambassadors, held a
similar view32.
At 7 P.M., on 22 October,
President Kennedy made a speech to the
American people. In this speech the
President informed the nation of the
                                                
30 Ibid.
31 Kent. Presenting. 2-3.
32 Ibid.
Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba and
the resulting crisis. During this speech
he outlined a plan of action to remove
the missiles from Cuba. Kennedy’s plan
was to use the blockade and diplomatic
pressure in order to force Khrushchev to
remove the missiles without an armed
confrontation. President Kennedy also
established the justification for an
American intervention in the Caribbean.
President Kennedy delivered this speech
in order to build credibility within the
United States and Latin America for his
blockade.
During the speech the President
made several indirect references to
photointelligence and its importance.
President Kennedy cited “unmistakable
evidence” of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The President also made reference to the
“surveillance” of Cuba, and its increase
since the discovery of the missiles. The
President also offered to defend his
position in any international forum of the
Soviet’s choosing. These strong
statements prove that Kennedy believed
in the validity the photointelligence.33
President Kennedy referred to the
missiles as a threat against the entire
western hemisphere. The president noted
that the American people had become
accustomed to the threat of Soviet
nuclear attack. However, the missiles
stationed in Cuba now placed Latin
America in danger of nuclear attack.
Citing several international agreements,
President Kennedy called on the
Organization of American States (OAS)
to adopt a resolution approving of
quarantine by the United States.34
The OAS met on October
twenty-third to discuss President
Kennedy’s request. Delegates from the
                                                
33 President Kennedy’s address to the Nation in:
Nathan. Anatomy. 171.
34 Ibid, 171-175.
other countries in the OAS were briefed
by representatives from the CIA and the
State Department. Following this
briefing the photointelligence was
presented for the delegates to inspect.
The photographs convinced the
delegates of seriousness of the situation
in Cuba. The delegates voted
unanimously in support of Kennedy’s
quarantine. This show of support helped
strengthen Kennedy’s position in the
international arena.35
The United Nations served as the
primary diplomatic battleground during
the crisis. On 22 October, 1962
Ambassador Stevenson had exchanged
remarks with the Soviet Ambassador. He
had accused the Soviets of deception in
stationing missiles and other strategic
forces in Cuba. Stevenson knew that
these claims would have to be supported
with hard evidence, in the form of
photointelligence.
The initial UN briefings were
made for ambassadors Europe and Latin
America, mostly United States allies.
The ambassadors were briefed about the
situation in Cuba and then shown
briefing boards of the photointelligence.
These boards detailed the deployment of
the missiles and the preparations of the
launch sites. The ambassadors reacted
favorably to the photography and agreed
with the United States’ position. Another
briefing later that day included
representatives from Cuba as well as
Asian and African countries. The
Cubans were especially impressed with
the photography.36
On the twenty-fifth Ambassador
Stevenson confronted the Soviet
Ambassador on the floor of the UN
Security Council. Stevenson had
received authorization to use U-2
                                                
35 Brugoini. EtE. 378-379.
36 Ibid. 396-397.
photography from Robert Kennedy.
When Stevenson made his speech to the
council he made extensive use of the
photointelligence. Several photography
boards showed the progression of the
Soviet missile sites. The Soviet
ambassador was powerless to counter
the claims of the United States in the
face of the photographic evidence. While
the Council took no direct action, the
political victory that evening was
enormous. The photography had proven
the American claim beyond any doubt. 37
During the crisis both sides were
on the brink of war. Even the slightest
provocation could have produced
catastrophe. On the twenty-seventh such
a provocation accidentally occurred. A
U-2 flying over Cuba was shot down by
Soviet forces operating a SA-2
installation. Cuban forces had opened
fire on the U-2 with their anti-aircraft
guns. These guns did not have the range
necessary to strike down the U-2,
however. Nearby a Soviet anti-aircraft
missile unit heard the firing and assumed
that an American invasion had begun.
The commander of the missile battery
was unable to reach his headquarters and
acted on his own initiative. He ordered
his men to track and destroy the intruder.
The U-2 was shot down and the pilot
was killed. This situation did nothing to
ease the tensions in the Western
Hemisphere and the officer responsible
was sharply reprimanded.38
Soviet Withdrawal
The following day Khrushchev
announced the withdrawal of Soviet
missiles from Cuba. An agreement had
been reached which would allow
                                                
37 Ibid. 426-429.
38 Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov. “The View From
Moscow and Havana” in ANADYR. 66-68.
Khrushchev to remove the missiles from
Cuba in exchange for a United States
pledge not to invade the island. A secret
clause in the agreement, not revealed
until the 1980s¸ called for the United
States to remove similar missiles from
Turkey. Shortly after this announcement
Soviet forces began dismantling the
missile bases and bombers in Cuba.39
Photointelligence planes
monitored the Soviet forces during their
withdrawal from Cuba. During the early
stages of the withdrawal the Soviet
forces seemed to be stalling and not
removing the equipment. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff continued to argue for an
attack on the missile sites. However, on
2 November, 1962, U-2 photography
showed that missile sites were being
disassembled and the missiles prepared
for shipping. After this confirmation,
photointelligence continued to reassure
the Kennedy administration that the
Soviet withdrawal was proceeding as
agreed.40
Soviet ships were monitored by
American aircraft throughout the journey
from Cuba to the Soviet Union. The
Soviet ships stored the ballistic missiles
on deck, removing their canvas tarps at
the sight of American planes. This
measure allowed the Americans to verify
the status of the weapons at all times and
helped to reduce tensions during the
resolution of the crisis.41
Conclusion and Lessons Learned
Khrushchev was depending on
the missiles remaining secret until they
were operational. This secrecy was
                                                
39 Nathan. Anatomy. 98-99.
40 Gen. Smith. “The View From Washington” in
ANADYR. 149.
41 Gen. Gribkov. “The View From Moscow and
Havana” in ANADYR. 73
central in his plan to prevent American
forces from acting before the missiles
were operational. When
photointelligence removed this secrecy,
Khrushchev was forced to go on the
defensive. Eventually Khrushchev was
forced to relent to the situation and
remove the missiles. Khrushchev
himself admits that American
photointelligence was a key factor in the
peaceful resolution of the crisis.42
Photointelligence showed some
limitations during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. These limitations are due, in part,
to the nature of photointelligence.
Photointelligence is designed to provide
information about permanent structures,
such as buildings and roads. When used
against mobile targets, such as troop
concentrations, the values of strategic
photointelligence is diminished.
Photointelligence failed to uncover the
presence of 45,000 Soviet troops in
Cuba. The CIA estimated that there were
fewer than 10,000 Soviet troops on the
island. Judging the number of properly
hidden ground forces is a difficult task
for photointerpreters. Ground troops
have less heavy equipment associated
with their deployment than missile
launchers and nuclear bombers.
Photointelligence also failed to
uncover definite proof of Soviet tactical
nuclear weapons. These weapons are
compact and have very short ranges
since they are designed for use on the
battlefield. In 1992 former Soviet
General Anatoli Gribkov revealed that
the Soviets had deployed more than 100
tactical nuclear weapons during the
Crisis. Former Secretary of Defense
McNamara noted that the use of such
weapons against American forces would
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have provoked retaliation on a similar
scale.43
Photointelligence provided
irrefutable evidence of the Soviet
missiles in Cuba. With this evidence the
Kennedy administration was able to
secure the support of our key allies, such
as Britain and France. Photointelligence
also convinced the OAS to support the
American quarantine of Cuba. This
intelligence proved vital in resolving the
crisis through diplomatic means.
Without photointelligence it would have
been impossible for President Kennedy
to take action against the missiles before
they were ready to strike.
Abbreviations
Anatomy - Anatomy of the Cuban
Missile Crisis
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CIA Documents - The Secret Cuban
Missile Crisis Documents
EtE - Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside
Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Intelligence - Intelligence and the Cuban
Missile Crisis
KR - Khrushchev Remembers
Mayday - MAYDAY: Eisenhower,
Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair.
NSA Reader - The CubanMmissile
Crisis, 1962: A National Security
Documents Reader
                                                
43 Gen. Gribkov. “Thirty Years Later” in
ANADYR. 165-166.; Gen Smith “looking Back”
174.
NPIC - National Photographic
Intelligence Center
Presenting - The Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962. Presenting the Photographic
Evidence Abroad
OAS - Organization of American States
SAM - Surface to Air Missile
UN - United Nations
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